A flurry of developments thus far in 2012 indicates that progress is potentially being made toward a political accommodation and negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. With both the Afghan Taliban movement interested in such an agreement and the United States and its allies looking for a smooth exit from the country, negotiating positions are becoming increasingly compatible.
Analysis
The Afghan Taliban movement and the United States are appearing increasingly open to political accommodation and a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Events in the first few weeks of 2012 have indicated either progress in talks, or at least that those talks are moving toward becoming more official.
The increasing formalization of talks in no way means that a significant agreement is close, but there are two important trends to note: First, the United States has made significant progress toward its original goals in Afghanistan. The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to hunt down the core al Qaeda leadership, disrupt its network and bring down the Taliban government that sheltered it. With the successful degradation of the old al Qaeda core and the killing of Osama bin Laden, Washington has good cause to consider that mission accomplished -- though continued pressure and vigilance are widely considered prudent and warranted. But while al Qaeda and the United States are fundamentally irreconcilable, this is not the case for the current Taliban movement. Though diffuse and decentralized, today's Taliban have national political ambitions but no longer espouse or seek to support transnational jihad.
Second, the United States and its allies have already begun to withdraw forces from the country. While a significant number of forces are slated to remain in Afghanistan until 2014 -- and there is interest in maintaining a smaller military presence for the foreseeable future -- at the moment neither side appears interested in dragging out the fighting. And with much of the foreign combat strength in the country effectively holding ground and protecting territory the Taliban have either ceded or lost, the intensity of combat operations is hardly at its peak (not to mention the fact that winter has arrived, marking the end of the traditional fighting season).
Given the current force structure and timetables of foreign forces in Afghanistan, there is no prospect of military defeat for the Taliban. The Taliban said as much when they declared victory Jan. 16. But their leadership is being aggressively hunted in special operations night raids and by armed unmanned aerial vehicles. And while the leadership has survived, they will face continued pressure from the $6 billion-per-year security apparatus being installed under Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime in Kabul. Furthermore, unlike in Iraq and Vietnam, there is not a powerful domestic American movement to end the war, so the United States and its allies have time to continue pursuing their goals. This means political accommodation, where the Taliban's principle objectives are readily achievable, is likely being seen as an increasingly attractive alternative to the movement compared to trying to retake the country by force while -- and after -- the United States and its allies accelerate the drawdown.
Taken together, both sides have powerful incentives to seek a negotiated settlement, even though there will inevitably be sticking points, and a finalized and implemented agreement is far from assured. This is the context for the series of notable developments that have occurred thus far in 2012.
On Jan. 3, the Taliban officially expressed interest in negotiations with Washington (its longstanding position has been that no talks can take place until foreign troops leave Afghanistan). They also announced an agreement to open a political office in Qatar (though no date for an actual opening has been released), specifically with the stated objective of reaching "understanding with other nations." The next day, Karzai "approved" the new office, which he has long opposed because it creates an avenue for negotiations outside of Kabul, which he has endeavored to keep at the center of any such discussions.
On Jan. 11, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged that discussions regarding the Taliban office in Qatar were taking place and that the release of Taliban prisoners held in the Guantanamo Bay was under consideration. The following day, Washington stated that it was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Taliban if Karzai approves the process. The real problem is reportedly that the Taliban have no interest in negotiations involving the government in Kabul, particularly given the fact that they seek a new constitution as a condition for entering into an inclusive national government as opposed to accepting a role in the current architecture -- which Karzai has spent the bulk of the last decade shaping to support his own influence and power.
Ethnic minority leaders in Afghanistan have meanwhile begun to make statements that they support a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. And on Jan. 16, the Taliban officially declared victory -- potentially clearing the plate for a negotiated settlement -- and U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman visited Qatar and Afghanistan. In addition, the Taliban have announced publicly that recently leaked video footage purportedly showing U.S. Marines urinating on the corpses of Taliban fighters -- classic fodder for their own propaganda efforts -- would not disrupt recent progress toward talks.
Alone, any one of these developments would be noteworthy but not necessarily remarkable. But taken as a whole, this flurry of activity is one of the most important developments of 2012 thus far and indicates significant progress toward formalizing political accommodation and a negotiated settlement between the United States and the Taliban. Stratfor does not forecast such success for negotiations in 2012, but the recent overt signals are difficult to ignore.
A flurry of developments thus far in 2012 indicates that progress is potentially being made toward a political accommodation and negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. With both the Afghan Taliban movement interested in such an agreement and the United States and its allies looking for a smooth exit from the country, negotiating positions are becoming increasingly compatible.
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Summary
AREF KARIMI/AFP/Getty Images
Taliban fighters join Afghan forces Dec. 29, 2011
Analysis
The Afghan Taliban movement and the United States are appearing increasingly open to political accommodation and a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Events in the first few weeks of 2012 have indicated either progress in talks, or at least that those talks are moving toward becoming more official.
The increasing formalization of talks in no way means that a significant agreement is close, but there are two important trends to note: First, the United States has made significant progress toward its original goals in Afghanistan. The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to hunt down the core al Qaeda leadership, disrupt its network and bring down the Taliban government that sheltered it. With the successful degradation of the old al Qaeda core and the killing of Osama bin Laden, Washington has good cause to consider that mission accomplished -- though continued pressure and vigilance are widely considered prudent and warranted. But while al Qaeda and the United States are fundamentally irreconcilable, this is not the case for the current Taliban movement. Though diffuse and decentralized, today's Taliban have national political ambitions but no longer espouse or seek to support transnational jihad.
Second, the United States and its allies have already begun to withdraw forces from the country. While a significant number of forces are slated to remain in Afghanistan until 2014 -- and there is interest in maintaining a smaller military presence for the foreseeable future -- at the moment neither side appears interested in dragging out the fighting. And with much of the foreign combat strength in the country effectively holding ground and protecting territory the Taliban have either ceded or lost, the intensity of combat operations is hardly at its peak (not to mention the fact that winter has arrived, marking the end of the traditional fighting season).
Given the current force structure and timetables of foreign forces in Afghanistan, there is no prospect of military defeat for the Taliban. The Taliban said as much when they declared victory Jan. 16. But their leadership is being aggressively hunted in special operations night raids and by armed unmanned aerial vehicles. And while the leadership has survived, they will face continued pressure from the $6 billion-per-year security apparatus being installed under Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime in Kabul. Furthermore, unlike in Iraq and Vietnam, there is not a powerful domestic American movement to end the war, so the United States and its allies have time to continue pursuing their goals. This means political accommodation, where the Taliban's principle objectives are readily achievable, is likely being seen as an increasingly attractive alternative to the movement compared to trying to retake the country by force while -- and after -- the United States and its allies accelerate the drawdown.
Taken together, both sides have powerful incentives to seek a negotiated settlement, even though there will inevitably be sticking points, and a finalized and implemented agreement is far from assured. This is the context for the series of notable developments that have occurred thus far in 2012.
On Jan. 3, the Taliban officially expressed interest in negotiations with Washington (its longstanding position has been that no talks can take place until foreign troops leave Afghanistan). They also announced an agreement to open a political office in Qatar (though no date for an actual opening has been released), specifically with the stated objective of reaching "understanding with other nations." The next day, Karzai "approved" the new office, which he has long opposed because it creates an avenue for negotiations outside of Kabul, which he has endeavored to keep at the center of any such discussions.
On Jan. 11, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged that discussions regarding the Taliban office in Qatar were taking place and that the release of Taliban prisoners held in the Guantanamo Bay was under consideration. The following day, Washington stated that it was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Taliban if Karzai approves the process. The real problem is reportedly that the Taliban have no interest in negotiations involving the government in Kabul, particularly given the fact that they seek a new constitution as a condition for entering into an inclusive national government as opposed to accepting a role in the current architecture -- which Karzai has spent the bulk of the last decade shaping to support his own influence and power.
Ethnic minority leaders in Afghanistan have meanwhile begun to make statements that they support a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. And on Jan. 16, the Taliban officially declared victory -- potentially clearing the plate for a negotiated settlement -- and U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman visited Qatar and Afghanistan. In addition, the Taliban have announced publicly that recently leaked video footage purportedly showing U.S. Marines urinating on the corpses of Taliban fighters -- classic fodder for their own propaganda efforts -- would not disrupt recent progress toward talks.
Alone, any one of these developments would be noteworthy but not necessarily remarkable. But taken as a whole, this flurry of activity is one of the most important developments of 2012 thus far and indicates significant progress toward formalizing political accommodation and a negotiated settlement between the United States and the Taliban. Stratfor does not forecast such success for negotiations in 2012, but the recent overt signals are difficult to ignore.